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Household survey data from Cote d'lvoire are used to predict in-
comes based on observable household characteristics, such as
region of residence and characteristics  of the household dwell-
ing. These predictions are then used to allocate money transfers
to alleviate poverty. Whether one should distribute poverty-al-
leviating transfers using this methiod  remains to be seen.
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dF-Policy,  Planning,  and Research
and  Human  Resources
Reducing poverty is a major objective of eco-  charactcristics and distribute transfers on the
nomic policies in both developed and develop-  basis of those predictions.  It appears that
ing countries. It is important that limited govem-  significant reductions in poverty can be achieved
ment resources be channeled to the poor, but it is  using this method.
not always easy to identify the poor directly.
Some of the variables that most reliably
Which households should be given transfers  predicted income level in CoMe  d'lvoire were:
(such as money, food stamps, vouchers, and  per capita floor area; whether the household was
rations) when reliable information on incomes is  headed by a member of the Voltaic ethnic group
difficult to obtain?  How much money (stamps,  (which is one of the poorest groups); the level of
vouchers, rations) should be given?  The  educational attainment of the head of household;
answers to these two questions depend on the  whether the household owned a car, a bike, or a
information available.  refrigerator.
Glewwe and Kanaan present a simple  Several problems with this approach are
method for targeting when income is not observ-  discussed. For example, the cost of gathering
able but other characteristics that are correlated  information may at times outweigh the benefits.
with income can be observed.  Using simple  Also, basing transfers on a policy that favors one
regression techniques on comprehensive house-  group over another might lead to public opposi-
hold survey data taken from Cote d'lvoire,  they  tion.
predict incomes based on observable household
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Reducing  poverty  is  one  of the  major  objectives  of economic  policies
in  both  developed  and  developing  countries. There  are  many  ways to  go about
achieving  this  task,  each  of  which  has  associated  costs. To the  extent  that
assistance  does indeed  reach  the  poor  overall  poverty  will  be reduced,  or even
eliminated  if the  funds  allocated  for  this  purpose  are large  enough. However,
it is  not  always  easy  to identify  the  poor  directly. Given  that  governments
have limited  resources  it  is important  that  assistance  is  not  mistakenly  given
to the  nonpoor,  who  may  attempt  to  gain  access  to benefits  by misrepresenting
their  income  status. The  task  of  ensuring  that  poverty  assistance  actually
reaches  the  neediest  is  often  referred  to  as the  targeting  issue."
Targeting  benefits  to reach  the  poor  can  be done  in  many  ways.  This
paper  is limited  to targeting  in the  form  of transfers  (money,  food  stamps,
rations,  etc.)  given  directLy  to  households  which  are  identified  as likely  to
be  poor.  The  relevant  questions  here  are:  1.  To  which  households  should  one
give  these  transfers,  given  that  reliable  information  on incomes  is difficult
to  obtain?  2. How  much  money  (or  stamps,  or rations)  should  be given? The
answers  to these  questions  depend  crucially  on the  information  available.
This  paper  preeants  a method  that  uses  data from  household  surveys  to increase
the  efficiency  of targeted  assistance.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows. The  next  section  discusses  the
theoretical  issues  involved  in  targeting. Section  III  provides  a  method  of
/  Recent  theoretical  papers  on targeting  include  Besley  and  Kanbur  (1988),
Kanbur  (1987),  Nicholas  and  Ze_khauser  (1982),  Ravallion  (1988),  and
Ravallion  and  Chao (1988).- 2 -
targeting  using  household  survey  data.  Section  IV  applies  this  method  using
data  from  Cote  d'Ivoire. The fifth  section  discusses  some  ways in  which  the
analysis  could  be extended,  and  the  last  section  concludes  the  paper.
II.  Principles  of  Targeting  Transfers  to  the  Poor
The  objective  of targeting  transfers  to the  poor  is  to reduce
measured  poverty  given  a fixed  amount  of money  available  for such
transfers.21  This  requires  an aggregate  index,  or  measure,  of poverty  for  use
in  comparing  the  outcom-s  of different  transfer  schemes. Formally,  let  y  -
(y1,y2 ,...yn)  be the  distribiution  of incomes  over  the  population  in
question. If an individual  has  an income  which  puts  him  or her  below  some
pre-specified  poverty  line  z, that  person  is  categorized  as poor.31 The
measure  of poverty  is  an index  which  indicates  the  aggregate  amount  of
poverty,  usually  giving  heavier  weight  to  those  who  are  deeper  in poverty. It
is  a function  of the  distribution  of incomes  y  and  the  poverty  line  z:
p  =  P(Y;z)  (1)
21  At this  point  assume  that  all transfers  must  be non-negative,  so  that  the
fixed  amount  of  money  must  be positive. The  analysis  here  can  be extended
to  allow  for  negative  transfers  (i.e.  taxes),  as discussed  briefly  in
Section  V.
31  For  clarity  of exposition,  assume  for  the  moment  that  we can treat
individuals  as living  in separate  households.  The  framework  easily
extends  to the  case  where  individuals  live  in  households  and  per  capita
income  is  used  as  a measure  of  poverty  status. This  is done  in the
empirical  section  of this  paper.Let  t =  (tlvt2v.**tn)  designate  a vector  if  transfer  incomes,  where
ti is the  transfer  to person  i.  These  transfers  are  to be given  to poor
people  so that  the  index  P(y;z)  is  minimized  sjbject  to the  constraint  that
total  transfers  cannot  exceed  the  amount  of  money  available  (denoted  by T)
that  purpose:
Min  P(y  +  t; z)  conditional  on E  t.5  T  (2)
Any individual  i  with  an income  above  z should  not  receive  a transfer  (ti=0)
since  that  individual  is  not poor.41
If  one  knows  the  incomes  yi for  each  person  this  can  be efficiently
solved  given  the  functional  form  of the  index  P(y;z). In  most cases  the
solution  would  require  that  the  marginal  transfer  dollar  go to the  poorest
person. Yet in  the  real  world  one  does  not  know  the  incomes  of either  the
poor  or the  non-poor  populations,  and  both  have  incentives  to understate  their
incomes  in  order  to obtain  more  government  transfers  than  they  would  otherwise
be entitled  to  receive. Targeting  thus  attempts  to  reduce  expected  poverty,
E[P(y;z)1,  given  that  y cannot  be  observed  but  some  idea  of likely
distribution  of the  elements  of  y, usually  based  on observable  characteristics
of individuals  which  are  correlated  with  y, can  be constructed.5/
41  Virtually  all poverty  indices  follow  the  focus  axiom  of Sen  (1976)  in  that
individuals  with incomes  above  the  poverty  line  have  no effe  t  on the
poverty  index  except  to serve  as a scaling  factor  when  calculating  the
incidence  of poverty  in  the  total  population.
5/  In reducing  expected  poverty  zhe  poverty  index  will  determine  the  relative
value  judgments  made  with  respect  to different  possible  outcomes. This  is
analogous  to the  role  of the  utility  function  when  maximizing  utility
under  uncertainty.- 4 -
Formally,  since  one  does  not  observe  the  true  y  one  must treat  each
element  of  y (recall  that  y is a  vector  of individual  incomes)  as a random
variable  for  which  there  exists  a joint  probability  distribution.  If one  has
absolutely  no idea  about  the  joint  distribution  of the  elements  y, one  cannot
calculate  expected  poverty  E[P(y;z)j  either  before  or after  transfers. Yet  if
one  has  some  information  on this  joint  distribution  expected  poverty  given  a
vector  of transfers  t can  be calculated  as
E[P(y  +  t; z)0J  fSP(y + t;  z) f(y)  dy  (3)
=  o  ...  0  P(y + t; z) f(ylly2l  ... yn) dy1dy2  ... dyn
where  f is  the joint  distribution  function  of  y and  the  second  term  denotes  a
simple  notation  for  the  third  term.6/
Equation  (3)  implicitly  assumes  that  one  can  identify  specific
individuals,  hence  the  subscript  1,2,...n. Yet  if y  is  not  observed  it is
unclear  how  one  can  distinguish  among  individuals.  Even  if  one  could  label
individuals,  targeting  transfers  is  not possible  without  some  kind  of
information  specific  to individuals  which:  1.  reveals  something  about  their
likely  incomes;  and  2.  varies  over  individuals.  Therefore,  in  order  to target
transfers  one  must  know the  distribution  of f  conditional  on a vector  of
observable  variables  xi (the  subscript  indicates  individual  i)  which  vary
6/  Note  that,  as in (2),  the  assumption  is  being  made  that  y  will  be
unaffected  by transfers.  The  reasonableness  of this  assumption  will  be
discussed  in Section  V.across  individuals.  Given  this  one  can  calculate  expected  poverty  for  a given
transfer  t as:
E[P(y  + t; z)jXJ  = fo P(y  +  t; z) f(vlX)dy  (4)
=  g  f  J  '  P(y +  t;  .)  f(YjPY7#--^Yn1x1tX2V**6Zn)  dyldy2 ...dyn
where  x  is  the  matrix  formed  by the  vectors  xl  to  zn-
If the  variables  one  observes  in  each  xi  are  sufficiently  correlated
with income  (y),  the  ability  to  observe  xi at the  individual  level,  coupled
with  knowledge  of f(yi...ynIx 1...  xn)  will  allow  for  the  targeting  transfers
to the  poor.  One  chooses  the  t that  minimizes  (4).
Generally  speaking,  the  more  variables  in the  vector  xi  the  better
one's  ability  to  reduce  expected  poverty  given  the  functional  form  of f  and  a
fixed  amount  of transfer  funds  T, sinc.i  the  minimization  of (4)  is facilitated
by the  consequent  reduction  of the  co'ariance  matrix  for  f(y|X). In  other
words,  more  accurate  information  about  the  distribution  of each  yi will  allow
for  improved  targeting  of transfers  to the  poor. One  can  define  this  improved
accuracy  in two  ways,  the  improvement  in  the  reduction  of  expected  poverty,
given  a fixed  amount  of funds,  from  added  information,  and  the  reduction  in
funds  required  to  attain  a pre-specified  poverty  level  due  to the  acquisition
of additional  information.  Define  the  former  as the  poverty  reduction  (PR)
benefit  of  additional  information  and  the  latter  as the  cost  reduction  (CR)-6-
benefit  of  new information.7/  They  are formally  defined  as follows:
PR(X 21yvXi,T,z)  =  Min E[P(y  +  t;  z)IXI,T]  - Min E[P(y  +  t;  z IX,T1  (5)
CR(X21y,X 1,T,z)  o Max(T  - £si)  conditional  on  (6)
Min E[P(y  + s; z)|X|  <  Min  E[P(y  +  t; z)IX,,T]
where  Xi is the  previous  set  of information,  X2 is the  new information,  and  X,
is the  combined  set  of information.81  Equation  (5)  is the  difference  between
the  minimization  of expected  poverty  given  the  information  in  Xi  and  the
minimization  of expected  poverty  given  that in  X.  It is  always  non-negative
and  should  be positive  if the  additional  information  in  X2 is  useful.
Equation  (6)  shows  how  much  money  can  be saved  when  additional  information
becomes  available  which  allows  the  government  to  more  accurately  target
transfers  to achieve  a pre-specified  poverty  level.
If one  limits  oneself  to  a relatively  small  amount  of information  one
can  directly  solve  (4)  using  household  survey  data  given  the  assumption  that
the  distribution  of incomes  found  in  the  survey  is identical  to that  found  in
the  population.  This  has been  done  by Ravallion  (1988)  and  Ravallion  and  Chao
(1988),  who limit  their  transfer  scheme  by dividing  up the  population  into  10
mutually  exclusive  groups  and  assuming  that  the  only information  available  is
the  membership  of each  individual  in  each  group  and the  distribution  of income
7/  The  cost  reduction  benefit  is  essentially  the  same  as Ravallion's  (1988)
equivalent  gain  from  targeting.
8/  In  most cases  additional  information  will  consist  of adding  more  variables
to the  vector  xi.-7-
within  each  group.91
However,  household  surveys  often  provide  a fairly  large  set  of
information  which  can  be used  to predict  income  levels. In the  next section  a
method  is  presented  which  is  based  on using  predicted  values  of income  given  a
large  number  of explanatory  variables. Except  in  very special  (and  unlikely)
cases,  it is  not  exactly  equivalent  to  minimization  of expected  poverty  as
given  in (4),  yet in practice  it  approximates  such  a minimization  and  is  both
intuitively  appealing  and  computationally  simple.
III.  Multivariate  Targeting  Using  Survey  Data
Suppose  one  could  predict  the incomes  of individuals  given  a set  of
explanatory  variables. If  one  took  these  predictions  and  distributed
transfers  to the  poor  under  the  assumption  that  these  predictions  were in  fact
their  true  incomes,  the  more precise  one's  predictions  the  more poverty  would
be alleviated  due  to better  targeting.
Specifically,  assume  that  the  income  of  household  i, yi can  be
predicted  by a vector  of  observable  variables  xi which  vary  over  households:
Yi=  g(x 1)  +  e. =  Yi + e.  (7)
The  error  term  ei accouncs  for  the  error  in the  prediction.  One does  not  have
to  assume  that  zi causes  yi,  but  simply  that  the  variables  in the  vector  xi
9/  In fact,  these  assumptions  allow  Ravallion  and  Chao  to calculate  actual
(as  opposed  to expected)  poverty  since  all  possible  outcomes  of the  joint
probability  distribution  are permutations  of  each  other.-8-
can  be used to predict  yi.  Given  an estimate  of the  functional  form  of  g, one
can  use  predicted  values  of the  vector  y,  denoted  by y, to  calculate  the
predicted  value  of P(y;z),  which  can  be defined  as:
P =  P (y;z).  (8)
Note  that  P is in  general  not equal  to  P(y;z)  and  is  not  even  necessarily  an
unbiased  predictor  of P.  This  depends  on the  econometric  technique  used  to
estimate  the  functional  form  of g and  on the  functional  form  of P.10/
Transfers  can then  be chosen  to  minimize  P subject  to the  funds  available.
Min  P(y  + t;  )  'onditional  on E ti 5  T  (9)
The effectiveness  of chis  method  in targeting  transfers  can  be easily
evaluated  using  data from  a sample  survey  by calculating  the  index  of poverty
after  implementing  the  transfers  derived  from  the  solution  of (9). This
amount  of poverty  can  be denoted  as
P(y  + t; z)  (10)
0/ For  example,  if P  were linear  in y  and r  an unbiased  predictor.of  y,  P
would  be an unbiased  predictor  of P.  Yet if  P is convex  in  y P is  biased
downwards  due  to Jensen's  inequality  (we  are  grateful  to  Tim  Besley  for
pointing  this  out). However,  note that  t>  estimate  of  poverty  when  this.
scheme  is implemented  (equation  (10))  is  .- ot necessarily  biased  even  if  P
is  a biased  estimate  of  P.-9-
where  t is  the solution  to equation  (9). Evaluation  of the  value  of
additional  information  can  be obtained  from  equations  analogous  to (5)  and  (6)
where P(y + t; z) replaces P(y + t; z).
At this  point  it is  useful  to  compare  this  approach  with the  theory
of the  previous  section,  where  expected  poverty  is  minimized  over  t.  The
approach  taken  here  minimizes  predicted  poverty  (8s  defined  in  (8))  over  t, as
expressed  in (9). Minimizing  predicted  poverty  is  a short-cut  method  that
approximates  minimization  of expected  poverty  as in (4). It saves  one  from
having  to  estimate  the  joint  distr.bution  f in  equation  (4)  and  requires  only
the  much easier  task  of estimating  g in  equation  (7). Although,  theoretically
speaking,  one  wants  to reduce  expected  poverty  with  one's  targeting  procedure,
this  requires  knowledge  of the  joint  distribution  of incomes  y conditional  on
X, which  is difficult  when  X contains  several  independent  variables."'  The
reduction  of predicted  poverty  is  more  tractable  and  equation  (10)  can  be used
to give  an exact  measurement  of targeting  accuracy  over the  survey  sample..  2!
Once one  has  decided  to  go this  route  some  thought  must  be given  to
ii,  In  principle  one  could  use  the  method  of Ravallion  as long  as one's
information  set  X  was restricted  to categorical  variables  so that  the
entire  population  could  be divided  into  a finite  number  of groups.
Applying  this  method  would  entail  a direct  minimization  of expected
poverty  as in (4). However,  if  X contains  continuous  variables  one  cannot
apply  the  method  without  losing  some  information.  Further,  Ravallion's
method  has  no framework  for  testing  the  statistical  significance  of the
benefit  from  adding  new information,  while  the  method  used  here  can  test
the  statistical  significance  when  estimating  g in  equation  (7).
12/  Note that  it  makes  little  sense  to  calculate  the  joint  distribution  of the
predicted  values  of y  since  cross-sectional  regression  techniques  assume
no correlation  across  y-'s  and  the  distribution  of the  point  estimates  of
each  yi result  from  distributional  assumptions  on  ei in (7),  which  are
difficult  to  verify.- 10  -
properties  which  the  observable  variables  (X's)  should  have.  First,  each
variable  must  be correlated  with income,  so that  the  variation  in the  error
term  ei in (7)  is  reduced  when  the  variable  is  added  to the  existing  set,
which  in turn  implies  that  reducing  predicted  poverty  will  be  more  highly
correlated  with reducing  actual  poverty. Second,  each  variable  should  truly
be easily  observed,  so that  it  cannot  be  hidden  and/or  misrepresented  by the
individuals. For  example,  if  one  decides  to give  transfers  to everyone  who
does  not own  a certain  type  of luxury  good,  such  as  a car,  individuals  with
cars  may be able  to  hide them  and  deny  that  they  own  a car  when  screening  for
eligibility  takes  place. Third,  the  variable  should  not  easily  be  changed  by
the  household. Using  the  above  example,  even if it  were  easy  to identify  car
ownership,  some  households  may  actually  sell  their  cars  and  hire  taxis  if  the
added  cost  were outweighed  by the  gain  from  becoming  eligible  for  transfers.
To estimate  incomes  as in (7)  one  needs  a  household  survey  with the
following  characteristics.  First,  the  survey  must be  a random  sample  from the
area  under  consideration.  For  example,  if  orne  wants  to  devise  a  nationwide
targeting  scheme  the  survey  must  be a sample  from  the  entire  country. Two,
the  income  data (or  expenditure  data,  see  below)  must  be relatively  accurate,
otherwise  it  will introduce  another  source  of error  and  in  addition  will  make
it  more  difficult  to judge,  via  equation  (10),  how  accurate  the  targeting
really  is.  Third,  the  survey  must  contain  a variety  of  explanatory  variables
which  can  be  effectively  used  as the  xi vector.
With such  data  simple  econometric  techniques  can  be used  to  predict  y
given  a matrix  X.  Since  the  primary  interest  is  predictive  accuracy,  rather
than  estimating  any  kind  of causal  structure,  the  main immediate  objective  iF- 11  -
a good statistical  fit  as measured  by summary  statistics  such  as the
correlation  coefficient  (R 2).  As long  as a variable  on the  right  hand side  of
the  regression  meets  the  three  criteria  presented  above  one  can  use  it to
predict  y.  For  estimation  one can  simply  use  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)
techniques,  so  that  one  estimates  a parameter  B under  the  assumption  that
g(xi)  =  ox. 12"  These  OLS esLimates  of income  can  then  be used  both  to
determine  whether  a  house  should  get  any  benefits  and, if  they  should,  what
the  level  of benefits  should  be,  by the  solution  of (9).
Before  beginning  the  data  analysis  in  the  next  section,  three  issues
need  to be  discussed,  the  use  of expenditure  data  instead  of income  data,  the
treatment  of household  size,  and the  choice  of poverty  index. In any  study  of
poverty  one is  ultimately  concerned  with  welfare  levels,  and  income  is  often
used  as an indicator  of them.  Yet  there  are  several  reasons  why it is  better
to use  expenditure  levels  rather  than  income  levels. First,  for  purely
theoretical  reasons,  income  only  generates  welfare  if it is  actually  used  to
raise  consumption  levels. On the  other  hand  expenditures  are  closely  tied
with  consumption  levels  and  are  thus  more  appropriate  from  a theoretical
level. The  inaccuracy  of income  for  measuring  welfare  levels  is  especially
true  of farmers  and  other  persons  whose  income  fluctuates  from  year  to year,
and such  people  are  often  found  in  developing  countries.  A more  compelling
reason  to use  expenditure  rather  than  income  data  is  that  the  latter  is  often
under-reported  by survey  respondents  who  fear  that  the  income  data  will be
31 Note  that  xs may include  quadratic  terms,  interaction  terms,  etc.  and thus
Oxi  can  approximate  any  functional  form  as in  a Taylor  expansion.- 12 -
used for  tax  purposes. Yet it is  reasonable  to  assume  that  they  are  much less
likely  to  under-report  expenditure  data  because  it is  gathered  by asking  many
questions  on specific  items  and thus  usually  does  not  trigger  fears  of tax
increases. Thus,  the  empirical  parc  of this  paper  examines  expenditure  levels
rather  than  income  levels.
Up to this  point  the  discussion  has  assumed  that individuals  do not
live  together  in  households,  but  of  course  they  do.  The  easiest  approach  to
take  here is  to divide  total  consumption  by household  size  and  use  this  as a
measure  of each individual's  welfare. This  is  not  completely  satisfactory
because  expenditures  may not  be divided  up equally  among  household  members  and
in  addition  there  are  likely  to be economies  to scale  so  that  larger
households  tend  to have  higher  welfare  levels  than  are indicated  by per  capita
consumption  figures. Unfortunately,  the  former  problem  is  almost  impossible
to solve  with  most  household  data  sets  since  they  usually  do not  have
information  on individual  consumption.  The  latter  problem  can  be resolved
only  by estimating  equivalence  scales,  which  is  often  a risky  venture  (cf.
Pollak  and  Wales,  1979). In order  to concentrate  on the  issue  of targeting  we
will  assume  throughout  the  paper  that  per  capita  expenditures  are  a valid
measure  of each  household  member's  welfare.
One final  issue  must  be settled  before  empirical  work can  begin:
Which  index  of poverty  should  be used? There  is  increasing  support  for  the
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke  (FGT)  class  of  measures  since  they  are  group
decomposable  and include  some  commonly  used  measures  as special  cases. In
addition,  this  family  of measures  is  not  known  to  have  any  obvious
disadvantages.  Hence  it is  convenient  to  use  them  here.  The  family  of- 13  -
measures  is  defined  by Foster,  Greer  and  Thorbecke  (1984)  as:
(Y;Z)  I  1  (  z  )  gi  Yi  z if Yi < Z  (11) ot  n  z1  1
= O  if Yi > z
where  a is  a constant  term  which  can  be set  at different  levels. In  general,
the  higher  a is the  more weight  one  gives  to the  poorest  of the  poor. If a=0
then  the  FGT  measure  becomes  the  headcount  ratio,  i.e.  the  proportion  of
people  in  poverty. If a=l  then  (11)  becomes  the  income  gap  ratio,  i.e.  the
minimum  amount  of  money  needed  to  bring  the  incomes  of all  the  poor  up  to the
poverty  line  as a fraction  of the  total  amount  of money  in society  if  everyone
had just  enough  money  to put  them  over  the  poverty  line.
The  headcount  is  universally  recognized  as a poor index  of poverty
because  it  completely  ignores  the  depth  of poverty  among  the  poor.  The  income
gap ratio  corrects  for  this  but  is sometimes  criticized  for  ignoring
inequality  among  the  poor.  For  example,  two  persons  whose  incomes  are  $50
below  the  poverty  line  are  treated  the  same  as one  person  with  an income  $99
below  the  poverty  line  and  another  with  an income  $1  below  the  poverty  line.
If  a is  greater  than 1  the  FGT  indices  show  more  poverty  when  greater
inequality  is found  among  the  poor,  ceteris  paribus. This  paper  will  use  the
FGT  measures  for  three  values  of  a: 1,  2 and  3.  Thus  the  income  gap  ratio  as
well  as two  indices  which  are sensitive  to inequality  among  the  poor  are
used.  For  all three  values  of a the  poverty  minimizing  strategy  is to  give- 14  -
the  marginal  transfer  dollar  to the  poorest  persons.14/
IV.  Application  of the  Method  to Survey  Data from  C6te  d'Ivoire
In this  section  the  application  of the  method  preserted  in Section
III  is  applied  to data  from  the  1985  C6te  d'Ivoire  Living  Standards  Survey
(CILSS),  which is  described  in  detail  in  Grootaert  (1986)  and  Ainsworth  and
Mufioz  (1986). The  choice  of country  is  primarily  due to  data  availability,
yet it  is of some interest  to apply  the  method  to  an African  country  since
poverty  is quite  severe  in  many  African  countries,  though  C6te  d'Ivoire  is
relatively  well off  by African  standards.  The variable  to  be predicted  is  per
capita  household  expenditures,  which  includes  imputed  values  of owner-occupied
housing  in  urban  areas. The construction  of the  expenditure  variable  is
explained  in  detail  in  Glewwe  (1987)  except,  unlike  in that  paper,  household
equivalence  scales  are  not  employed  here.
At this  point  it is  instructive  to discuss  the  Ivorian  economy
briefly. C6te  d'Ivoire  is  found  in  West  Africa  on the  Gulf  of  Guineau. It
received  its  independence  from  France  in 1960  and  up to the  late  1970's  was
considered  to  be one  of Africa's  success  stories  (cf.  den  Tuinder,  1978). Its
main  export  crops  are  coffee  and  cocoa. Since  the  early  1980's  the  economy
has  declined,  in  part  due  to declining  prices  of coffee  and  cocoa. Yet  it is
still  better  off than  most  other  West  African  countries  and  has  a relatively
high  proportion  of the  population  in  urban  areas,  about  43Z. The  vast
14/  For  the income  gap  ratio  this  strategy  is sufficient  but  not  necessary  -
one  need  only  ensure  that  all  transfers  go to individuals  whose  incomes
are  below  the  poverty  line.- 15  -
majority  of the  poor  are  found  in  rural  C6te  d'Ivoire  (cf.  Glewwe,  1987),  and
a disproportionate  number  are  found  in  the  northern  savannah  areas  which  are
too  dry  for  cocoa  and  coffee  cultivation.  This paper  will investigate
targeting  in both  urban  and  rural  areas  even  though  the  latter  are  much  better
off  than  the  former.
A.  Welfare  Levels  and  Urban  Households'  Characteristics
The  f:.rst  step  in  applying  the  method  of the  previous  section  to
urban  areas  in  C6te  d'Ivoire  is to  estimate  (7). The  explanatory  variables
used  are  defined  in  Table  1. Table  2  presents  regressions  of the  logarithm  of
per  capita  househo.d  expenditures  on  different  sets  of  explanatory  variables.
These  variables  can  be grouped  into  five  categories: (a)  regional  dummy
variables;  (b)  characteristics  of the  household's  dwelling  and  the  source  of
the  household's  drinking  water;  (c)  ethnic  origin  of the  head  of  household;
(d)  level  of education  of the  head  of  household;  (e)  ownership  cf durable
goods  by the  household. The  variables  in  categories  (a),  (b)  and  (c)  should
be relatively  easy  to  observe  and indeed  can  usually  be observed  directly.
However,  the  level  of  education  of the  head  of household  and the  ownership  of
certain  durable  goods  may  be more  difficult  to obtain  and  could  conceivably  be
disguised. Of course,  there  exist  other  variables,  such  as net  savings,  which
are  likely  to be  highly  correlated  with levels  of  welfare. These  are  not
included  because  of  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  accurate  information  on them.
The regression  in  column  1  of  Table  2 (Model  1) includes  only
variables  in categories  (a),  (b)  and  (c). Variables  which  had  relatively  weak
explanatory  power  in preliminary  regressions  were  excluded. Only  one  regional- 16  -
dummy  variable  was statistically  significant  - households  in the  East  Forest
(Southeast)  region  of C6te  d'Ivoire  are  relatively  worse  off,  ceteris
paribus. Turning  to the  characteristics  of the  dwelling,  it is surprising
that the  log  of the  floor  area is  not  a good indicator  of  household  welfare.
It  will  be seen  below  that  per  capita  floor  area  performs  much  better. Two
v'ariables  which  are  better  predictors  of  household  per  capita  expenditure
levels  are  dummy  variables  which  indicate  whether  the  dwelling  is  a single
house  or an apartment  (HOUSE  and  APT,  respectively).  The  alternative  living
arrangement  is sharing  a compound  with other  families,  which  is  apparently
viewed  as less  desirable  and  consequently  is  associated  with  lower  per  capita
incomes.
Dwelling  quality  also provides  information  on households'  living
standards. Wood  or stone  walls,  a cement  roof,  and  a  flush  toilet  are  all
s.ongly  associated  with  higher  levels  of  household  welfare. Windows  with  no
covering  are  relatively  undesirable  and  thus  have  a weakly  negative  predictive
power. Households  whose  main source  of  water  is  a well  without  a pump  have
lower  levels  of welfare  while  those  whose  main source  of water  is  an indoor
faucet  have  higher  levels. Only  one  ethnic  group  variable  had substantial
explanatory  power,  households  headed  by  a member  of the  Voltaic  ethnic  group
are significantly  worse  off.
Education  levels  are  often  strongly  correlated  with the  living
conditions  of households  since  more  educated  individuals  tend  to  have  higher
incomes. The second  column  of Table  2 (Model  2)  adds  variables  indicating  the
education  level  of the  head  of household. Households  whose  head  has  attained
a junior  secondary,  senior  secondary,  or  university  level  of  education  have- 17 -
higher  levels  of welfare  than  otherwise  identical  households  with  no
education. If such  information  could  be obtained  accurately  at a low  cost,
targeting  of transfers  would  be enhanced. Column  3 of Table  2 (Model  3)
focuses  on the  ownership  of durable  goods. Ownership  of  a car  or refrigerator
is strongly  associated  with  higher  levels  of welfare,  but  bicycle  ownership
indicates  lower  levels. Thus  data  on the  possession  of these  goods  may
further  enhance  targeting.
It was seen  above  that  a dwelling's  floor  area  had little  explanatory
power. It turns  out  that  a better  indicator  is  floor  area  per  capita,  as
confirmed  in  column  4 of  Table  2 (Model  4).  Yet  this  requires  knowledge  of
household  size,  and  it is possible  that  households  could  misrepresent  this.
In any  case,  the  value  of  accurate  information  on  household  size  is  evident  in
this  regression.  The last  column  of Table  2 includes  all  variables  discussed
so far.  If all  this  information  can  be obtained  fairly  accurate  predictions
on per  capita  expenditure  levels  can  be obtained,  as indicated  by the  R2
coefficient  of 0.654.
B.  Welfare  Levels  and  Rural  Households'  Characteristics
The 1985  CILSS  data include  community  characteristics  from  the  rural
areas  sampled,  as well  as data  on farming  activities.  One  can  use  these  data
for  regressions  in  rural  C8te  d'Ivoire. The  new  explanatory  variables  are
defined  in  Table  3 and  the  regressions  are  given  in  Table  4.
The first  column  in  Table  4 (Model  1)  gives  the  basic  regression.
Examining  first  dwelling  characteristics,  it is  surprising  that  floor  area is
negatively  associated  with  per  capita  expenditures.  Yet  recall  that  floor- 18  -
area per  capita  is  perhaps  a better  indicator  of welfare. This is  examined
below. Most  of the  other  estimated  parameters  for  variables  representing
dwelling  characteristics  have  the  expected  signs,  but  often  with low  t-
statistics.  As with  urban  areas,  single  homes,  apartments  and  flush  toilets
are positively  associated  with  household  welfare,  while  adobe  walls,  water
from  wells  without  pumpsL5/  and  windows  with  no coverings  are  negatively
associated. Another  weakly  positive  indicator  is  bamboo  walls,  while  negative
indicators  are  water  from  wells  with  pumps,  bamboo  floors  and  the  complete
absence  of  windows  in the  uwelling. More  success  in  predicting  per  capita
expenditures  comes  from  ethnic  group  dummy  variables  - Akan,  Northern  Mande,
Voltaic  and  non-Ivorian  (i.e.  immigrants  from  neighboring  countries)
households  tend  to be  worse  off  relative  to other  ethnic  groups.
Turning  to the  community  characteristics,  welfare  levels  are
negatively  correlated  with the  distance  from  Abidjan,  perhaps  due to  either
the  gradual  spread  "modernizing  influences"  from  Abidjan  to the  rest  Cate
d'Ivoire  or to poorer  soil  quality  as one  moves  from  south  to  north.
Communities  where  Islam  is the  predominant  religion  tend  to  be better  off,  but
not significantly  so.  Households  residing  in communities  whose  major  crop is
cocoa  have,  on average,  higner  levels  of welfare,  which  may  reflect  the
benefits  of living  in  areas  well suited  to cultivating  this  lucrative  crop.
Note that  after  controlling  for  these  effects  the  East  Forest  area is
relatively  worse-off  relative  to the  rest  of the  country. Finally,  distance
15/  This is  grouped  with  water  from  river  or other  natural  source,  since  the
coefficients  on both  these  dummy  variables  were  virtually  identical.- 19  -
to  markets  is negatively  associated  with  household  wetfare,  while  the
correlation  with adult  male  wage  rates  is  positive.
The  variables  discussed  so far  should  be  relatively  easy  to
observe. The second  column  of Table  4 (Model  2)  examines  the  extent  to  which
accurate  information  on land  holdings  can improve  the  predicative  power  of the
regression.  Data  on household  land  planted  in coffee  offers  no predictive
power,  but  land  planted  with  cocoa  and  other  types  of cultivated  land  are
positively  associated  with  welfare  levels. In  contrast  with  urban  areas,
information  on the  education  of head  of  household  has  a  much lower  degree  of
explanatory  power  in  rural  areas,  as seen  in column  3 (Model  3).  This  may  be
due  to the  relatively  small  number  of better  educated  individuals  in  rural
C8te  d'Ivoire. Examining  the  durable  items'  coefficients  in  column  4 (Model
4),  one  fees that,  in  contrast  to the  case  of  urban  households,  the  parameter
for  ownership  of  a refrigerator  is  no longer  significant,  perhaps  reflecting
the  general  lack  of refrigerators  in  rural  areas.
The fifth  column  of Table  4 (Model  5)  clearly  demonstrates  that  per
capita  floor  area  has strong  predictive  power,  which  suggests  that  if one  can
get  reliable  data  on household  size,  one  can  better  target  benefits  to the
poor.  Finally,  the  last  column  of  Table  4 shows  that  with  all  of the
variables  combined  the  R2 coefficient  reaches  0.319. Compared  to  urban
households,  the  ability  to predict  household  expenditure  variables  based  on
easily  observable  household  characteristics  is  relatively  poor. This suggests
that  targeting  transfers  to the  poor  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  might  prove  to  be easier
in  urban  areas,  even  though  the  vast  majority  of the  poor  are  in  rural  areas.- 20 -
C. Targeting  Transfers  in  Urban  Cote  d'Ivoire
Using  the  regressions  given  in  Table  2 one  can  calculate  (10),
poverty  after  transfers,  where  transfers  are  based  on predicted  income  levels,
for  urban  Cote  d'Ivoire. The  relevant  calculations  are  given  in  Table  5.  A
poverty  line  of 148,690  CFA  Francs  per  capita  per  year is  used,  which
classifies  30%  of the  urban  population  as poor.L61 Turning  to the  top  half  of
Table  5,  assume  that  10,000,000  CFA  Francs  are  available  for  transfers.l7/
The  first  row  of Table  5 calculates  poverty,  using  equation  (11),  for  three
different  values  for  a.  As a increases  the  poverty  index  declines,  yet  this
has  no meaning  whatsoever  because  the  only  relevant  comparisons  of levels  of
poverty  indices  are  within  a given  value  of a.  Yet,  changes,  in levels  can  be
compared  for  different  values  of a,  as will  be done  below.
The  remaining  rows in  top  half  of Table  5 show  poverty  levels,
calculated  from  the  CILSS  data,  when 10  million  CFA  Francs  are  available  for
transfers  to the  poor  with  varying  amounts  of information.  In the  row  labeled
"untargeted"  it is  assumed  that  no information  is  available,  so  one  has  no
choice  but  to give  everyone  an equal  transfer  regardless  of expenditure
level. This  untargeted  approach  reduces  poverty  by a relatively  small  amount
- between  5%  and 8% for  different  values  of a (see  figures  in  parentheses).
If instead  one  uses  the  predicted  income  from  the  regression  in  Column  1 of
61 Any  poverty  line  embodies  a value  judgment  regarding  who is  poor. We have
chosen  this  poverty  line  for  expositional  purposes.
71  Since  the  CILSS  is  a random  sample  of approximately  0.13%  of the  Ivorian
population,  10,000,000  CFA  applied  to  reducing  poverty  in  the  sample  is
equivalent  to 7.83  billion  CFA  (about  $20  million)  on a nationwide  basis.- 21 -
Table  2, call  it  Model  1,  poverty  can  be reduced  substantially,  from  a 10%
decline  for  a =  1 to  a 22%  drop  for  a =  3.
The  value  of  having  additional  data  on either  the  head  of household's
education,  ownership  of durable  goods,  or household  size  (in  order  to
calculate  per  capita  floor  area)  can  be seen  in  the  rows  marked  Model  2, Model
3 and  Model  4, respectively.  The information  on the  household  head's
education  reduces  poverty  somewhat  beyond  the  reduction  from  Model  1
information  alone,  but  knowledge  of durable  goods  owned  by the  household  has
little  effect,  despite  strong  t-statistics  in  Table  2.  Further  investigation
revealed  that  this  greater  predictive  power  from  information  on durable  goods
took  place  primarily  at the  wealthier  end  of the  distribution  and thus
contributed  very little  to distinguishing  the  poorest  households  from  the  rest
of the  population.181  Thus  although  the  R2 coefficients  in  Table  2 are  often
highly  correlated  with  targeting  accuracy,  a generally  better  statistical  fit
may  be of little  use if it  takes  place  at the  higher  income  levels. Data  on
per  capita  floor  area (Model  4) allow  for  a greater  reduction  in  poverty  than
data  on the  education  of the  head  for  a  =  1  and  a =  2, but  have  virtually  the
same  reduction  for  a =  3.  Finally,  the  row  marked  Model  5 shows  how  much
poverty  can  be reduced  if  all  three  sets  of variables  can  be  observed.
At this  point  it is  useful  to say  something  about  the  difference
a makes  when  measuring  poverty. Recall  that  the  higher  a is,  the  more  weight
placed  on the  poorest  of the  poor.  In  all the  "models"  of  Table  5,  and in  the
18/  When  Model  3  was re-estimated  using  only the  poorest  30%  of the  population
the  t-statistics  on all  three  durable  goods  were insignificant.- 22  -
untargeted  and  perfect  targeting  cases  as well,  the  higher  a is the  more
poverty  can  be reduced,  in  percentage  terms,  with  a given  amount  of money.
This reflects  the  fact  that  the  higher  a  is,  the  greater  the  total  "amount"  of
poverty  is due  to the  poorest  of the  poor,  and  consequently  the  more  one  can
do, in  percentage  terms,  with  a fixed  amount  of  money  as long  as it is  well
targeted  toward  the  poorest  groups. Yet,  relative  to the  poverty  reduction
that  would  take  place  if perfect  targeting  were  possible  (i.e.  if  one  could
observe  expenditure  levels  directly),  targeting  under  imperfect  informatiorn  is
more  difficult  the  higher  a  is.  This is  due to  the  fact  that  at lower  values
of a targeting  need  not be very  accurate  as long  as it gets  to someone  who  is
poor  (e.g.  when  a =  1),  while  higher  values  of a require  greater  precision  to
target  the  poorest  of the  poor.  Thus  the  effectiveness  of targeting  with
imperfect  information  depends  on the  value  of a (a  normative  judgment)  and  on
whether  one's  goal is stated  relative  to zero  poverty  or relative  to the
poverty  that  would  prevail  if  perfect  targeting  were  possible.
The second  half  of Table  5 repeats  the  analysis  assuming  total
transfer  funds  are  20,000,000  CFA  Francs,.  The same  general  conclusions  hold,
but  it is clear  that  doubling  the  amount  of  money  does  not  double  the
reduction  in poverty  under  imperfect  targeting.191  As one  might  expect,  as
more  money  is  added  to  the  transfer  fund  the  marginal  effect  of a given  amount
of  money  on poverty  decreases. This  decrease  in  the  marginal  effect  is
relatively  weak for  a =  1, since  that  measure  of poverty  does  not  distinguish
19/  Untargeted  transfers  roughly  have  a double  effect,  while  perfectly
targeted  transfers  by definition  have  a double  effect  when  a - 19  but
must  have decreasing  returns  fGr  a  > 1.- 23 -
between  the  marginal  dollar  given  to a  very poor  person  and  that  given  to only
a  mildly  poor  person. As a becomes  larger,  doubling  the  amount  of  mo'ney
clearly  does  not  double  the  decline  in poverty  since  poverty  indices  with  high
values  of a put  more  weight  on giving  the  first  funds  to the  neediest
households.  Note  also  the  perverse  result  that  poverty  reductions  from  model
3 are  lower  than  those  from  Model  1  even  though  the  former  employs  more
information  and  has  a  more  accurate  fit  as  measured  by the  R2 coefficient.  As
was  already  seen  with  Model  3 above,  a better  fit  for  the  entire  range  of rich
and  poor  households  may  not  fit  so  well for  the  poorest  households,  and in
this  case  the  fit  on the  latter  actually  becomes  worse. This  leads  to  an
important  result  - a good information  set  for  targeting  transfers  must  be
measured  only  in terms  of its  reduction  in  measured  poverty,  not in terms  of a
regression's  overall  predictive  power.
Table  6 calculates  poverty  reductions,  as defined  in  equation  (5),
for  the  different  models.201 Recall  that  poverty  reductions  depend  on the
information  already  available  (Xi)  as  well  as the  new  information  (X 2).  The
figures  in  Table  6  are  calculated  with  respect  to two  initial  information
sets:  no information  at all,  which  corresponds  to untargeted  transfers,  and
information  limited  to  regional  location,  dwelling  characteristics  and
household  water  supply,  and  ethnic  background  of households,  which  corresponds
to  Model  1. Take the  case  where  10  million  CFA  Francs  are  available  for
transfers,  which  is shown  in  the  top  half  of Table  6.  Relative  to no
information  at  all, the  various  models  reduce  poverty  by  6-10%  for  a  =  1 to
20/  Note  we replace  P(y  +  t;z)  with P(y  +  t;z),  as  explained  in  Section  III.- 24 -
15-23%  for  a  =  3.  Of course,  perfect  information  reduces  poverty  much  more.
Relative  to  the  information  set  included  in  Model  1, the  new information
embodied  in  Model  3 is  almost  inconsequential,  while  Model  2  does somewhat
better  and  Model  4 better  still. The  results  when  20  million  CFA  Francs  are
available  show  the  same  trends,  except  it is  worth  noting  that  using  Model  3
actually  raises  poverty  relative  to  Model  1  despite  its  larger  information
set,  the  possibility  of  which  was  explained  in  the  preceding  paragraph.
The calculations  otfered  so far  are  of some  interest  but the  real
question  faced  by policy  makers  is:  which  types  of information  are  worth
collecting? Presumably  one  can  get  estimates  of the  marginal  cost  of
collecting  some  additional  amount  of information  on  households,  but  what is
the  marginal  benefit? This  question  can  be answered  using  calculations  of
cost  reductions,  which  were  defined  in (6)  (cf.  footnote  20). It is  crucial
to  realize  that  cost  reductions,  as seen  in  equation  (6),  depend  on:  1.  The
poverty  line  chosen  (z); 2. The  definition  of poverty  used  (in  this  case  the
different  values  of  a);  3. The  amount  of money  available  for  transfers  (T);
and  4. The initial  set  of information  (X 1).  The  difference  these  make  is seen
in  Table  7,  where  all  these  vary  except  the  poverty  line itself. The  poverty
line  chosen,  as  well  as the  poverty  definition,  are  pure  value  judgments.  The
amount  of money  available  is  the  product  of  a political  process  which  itself
embodies  value  judgments. Yet  the initial  set  of information  can  be
constructed,  starting  with  very  low  cost  information  (such  as region  of
residence)  in  a relatively  objective  manner. The  generet  rule  is: if  the
money  saved,  as calculated  in (7),  is  greater  than  the  marginal  cost  of
collecting  the  additional  information,  the  data should  be collected. This  can- 25 -
be  determined  using  comprehensive  household  survey  data,  as done  here.
The figures  in the  top  half  of Table  7  give  the  amount  of money  which
can  be saved  from  new  information,  starting  from  a base  of 10  million  CFA
Francs. These  figures  apply  to the  sample  only,  and  to  obtain  figures  for  all
Cote  d'Ivoire  they  should  be  multiplied  by 769  (cf.  footnote.  17). Taking  the
initial  case  of  no information  (i.e.  completely  untarge-ed  transfers),  about
6-9  million  ef the  original  10  million  CFA  Francs  (5-7  billion  CFA  Francs  for
all  Cote  d'Ivoire)  can  be saved  using  the  various  targeting  models. This is  a
substantial  drop  in  costs  and  one  would  think  that  the  cost  of gathering  the
information  is likely  to be  much less.  In  many  cases  much  of the information
required  may  already  be available  from  national  census  data  (e.g.  housing
characteristics)  and  if  not  the  marginal  cost  of amending  the  census  to
collect  it  may  be rather  small. It is  also interesting  to  note that,  for  the
case  of no information,  differences  in the  value  of a do  not seem  to  make  a
big  difference  in  terms  of cost  reductions.  Thus,  one  could  go ahead  with  a
targeting  scheme  even  if  ones  value  judgment  regarding  the  proper  value
of  a  is  not  fully  thought  out.
Turning  to the  situation  where  initial  information  consists  of the
variables  in  Model  1, the  marginal  cost  reduction  gains  of  new information  are
relatively  low,  but  still  substantial.  There  is  also  more  variation
across  a,  especially  for  Model  2.  It is  useful  to  take  one  example,  the  value
of knowing  household  size,  which  allows  one  to  create  the  per  capita  floor
area  variable. Turning  to  Model  4, between  1.8  and  2.6  million  CFA  Francs
could  be saved  if  accurate  information  on  household  size  were  collected  to
supplement  data  used  in  Model  1.  Extrapolating  for  C8te  d'Ivoire  as a whole,- 26  -
the  savings  would  amount  to between  1.4  and  2.0  billion  CFA  Francs. In  other
words,  as indicated  by the  figures  in parentheses,  the  amount  of transfers
could  be cut  by 18-26%  without  reducing  poverty  if information  on  houselold
size  were  available.
The  bottom  half  of Table  7 presents  cost  reductions  when the  amount
originally  available  for  transfers  is  doubled  to 20  million  CFA Francs. For
the  case  where  no information  was originally  available,  the  savings  from  new
information  are slightly  less  than  double  those  where  no information  is
available  with 10  million  CFA  Francs. When initial  in'ormation  consists  of
the  data  used in  Model  1,  moving  from  10 to  20  million  CFA  Francs  usually
increases  savings  but  not  always. For  example,  Model  3 is  dominated  by Model
1  at higher  levels  of transfer.
D. Targeting  Transfers  in  Rural  C6te  d'Ivoire
Using  the  regressions  shown  in  Table  4, one  can  examine  the  effect  of
targeting  on poverty  in  rural  C6te  d'Ivoire. Table  8 shows  targeting
effectiveness  for :ransfers  of 10,000,000  and  20,000,000  CFA  Francs. The
poverty  line  which  classifies  30%  of the  rural  population  as poor  (87,790  CFA
Francs  per  capita)  is  well  below  the  corresponding  line  for  the  urban
population.  Note that  initial  poverty  levels  are  higher  in  rural  areas
relative  to  urban  areas  even  though  both  were  given  a 30%  cut  off  line. This
indicates  that  the  poor  in  rural  areas  are  deeper  in poverty,  relatively  to
their  30%  line,  than  the  poor  in urban  areas  relative  to their  30%  line. The
top  half  of  Table  8 shows  changes  in poverty  when 10,000,000  CPA  Francs  are
targeted  using  various  information  sets. The  untargeted  allocation  reduces- 27 -
poverty  by 5% to 10  for  different  values  of  a.  If Model  1 is  used,  poverty
can  be reduced  from  14%  for  a =  1  to 26%  for  a =  3.
The  value  of adding  the  information  sets  relating  to land  holdings,
head  of  household's  education,  ownership  of  durable  goods  or household  size
can  be seen  in the  rows  for  Models  2 to 5, respectively.  Clearly,  none  of
these  models  leads  to  a significantly  greater  reduction  in poverty  than  that
achieved  by the  basic  model.  In fact,  whereas  Model  2  and  Model  4 reduce
poverty  marginally  relative  to  Model  1,  Models  3  and 5  perform  worse. Further
investigation  revealed  that  when the  regressions  for  Models  2, 3,  4 and  5  are
run  for  the  poorest  50%  of the  population,  the  predictive  power  of Models  2, 3
and  4 improve  very  little  over  that  of Model  1,  and the  predictive  power  of
Model  5  becomes  worse. The bottom  half  of Table  8 repeats  the  analysis  with
20  million  CFA  Francs. As in  urban  areas,  doubling  the  amount  of  money  for
transfers  does  not  double  the  effectiveness  of targeting.
Table  9 gives  poverty  reductions  resulting  from  increased  information
in rural  C8te  d'Ivoire. Models  3, 5  and  6 are  omitted  from  the  table  because
they  performed  worse  in reducing  poverty  than  Model  1.  As was  apparent  in
Table  8, it is  difficult  to improve  on  Model  1 in  rural  areas. Of course,
this  does  not  mean  that it is  harder  to target  in rural  areas;  poverty
reductions,  in  percentage  terms,  are  of the  same  order  of magnitude  with  Model
1 in  rural  areas  as they  are  with  Model  4 in  urban  areas. The  important
lesson  here is that  the  goodness  of fit  of different  regressions  across
different  regions  (e.g.  urban  vs.  rural)  does  not  necessarily  indicate  the
potential  for  poverty  reductions. In the  case  of C8te  d'Ivoire,  it is  harder
to predict  accurately  the  per  capita  expenditure  levels  of rural  residents,- 28  -
relative  to their  urban  counterparts,  but  this  difference  in accuracy
disappears  if  one  confines  the  regressions  to the  poorest  30X  of the
population  in  each  area  (in  such  cases  R2 ranged  from  0.20  to 0.25  in  both
urban  and  rural  C6te  d'lvoire).21/
Finally,  Table  10 presents  cost  reductions  possible  in rural  areas.
They  are  of the  same  magnitude  as those  in  urban  areas  - between  6 to  8
million  out  of an initial  10  million  CFA  Francs  can  be saved  if targeting  is
done  according  to  the  method  presented  in  this  paper. If initially  20  million
CFA  Francs  are  available,  about  13 to 14  million  can  be saved  by targeting.
At first,  it  may seem  contradictory  that  Model  1 is superior  to  Models  2  and  4
in  terms  of cost  reductions  (Table  10)  but is  inferior  in terms  of poverty
reductions  (Table  9).  The  difference  is  explained  in that  Model  1  can  reduce
poverty  less  effectively  than  Models  2 and  4  when 10  million  CFA  Francs  are
available  but  more  effectively  if  about  2.5  or 3  million  CFA  Francs  are
available  (this  latter  range  is  dictated  by the  need to  match  the  poverty
level,  as given  in  the second  row  of Table  8,  attained  by untargeted  transfers
of 10  million  CFA  Francs).
As in  urban  areas,  if the  information  necessary  can  be collected  at a
cost  smaller  than  the  cost  reductions  shown  in  Table  10,  the  data  should  be
gathered. This is  analogous  to standard  cost-benefit  analysis  procedures.
Note,  however,  that  it is  the  marginal  increment  in  savings  that  is  relevant
for  the  decision  rule. Suppose,  using  the  numbers  in  the  top  half  of Table
211  It  was  thought  that  improved  targeting  might  result  if  (7)  were  estimated
using  only the  poorest  30%  or poorest  50%  of the  households  in the
sample. In  principle  this  could  work  but in  fact  it did  not.- 29  -
10,  it  would  cost  4 million  CFA  Francs  to  gather  the  data  needed  to implement
Model  1,  and  6 million  CFA  Francs  to implement  Model  2.  Even  though  one  can
save  money,  relative  to  untargeted  transfers,  by implementing  Model  2,  one
should  only implement  Model  1  because,  relative  to  Model  1,  Model  2  does  not
save  an additional  2  million  CFA  Francs  (and  in fact  results  in  a loss  of
400,000  CFA  Francs).
E.  Allocating  Funds  Between  Urban  and  Rural  Areas
So far  this  section  has  treated  urban  and  rural  areas  separately.
This  was done  mainly  for  purposes  of exposition. In fact  policy  makers  are
likely  to be faced  with the  question  of  how  much transfers  should  go to  urban
areas  and  how  much  should  go to  rural  areas. In this  subsection  a common
poverty  line  is drawn  for  all  of Cote  d'Ivoire  to see,  given  the  models
calculated  above,  how  a given  amount  of  money  can  be targeted  across  both
urban  and  rural  areas  in  order  to reduce  poverty. A national  poverty  line  of
110,000  CFA  Francs  is  used,  which  classifies  30X  of the  population  as poor.
Abstracting  from  information  costs,  if  one  had 10  million  or 20
million  CFA  Francs,  how should  the  funds  be split  up between  urban  and  rural
areas  under  the system  of targeting  presented  in this  paper? Clearly,  one
should  use  the  best  model  available  for  both  urban  and  rural  areas  and  split
the  funds  up in  a way  which  minimizes  nationwide  poverty. Employing  Model  5
in  urban  areas  and  Model  1 in  rural  areas,  if  one  has 10  million  CFA  Francs
poverty  is  minimized  by targeting  9  million  in  rural  areas  and  only 1  million
in  urban  areas. The  split  with  20  million  CFA  Francs  is  even  more lopsided  -
19  million  should  go to rural  areas  and  only 1  million  in  urban  areas. The- 30 -
value  of a  did  not  matter  in  either  case.221 Thus  even though  one  can  better
predict  household  expenditure  levels  in  urban  areas,  one  cannot  do it  better
among  the  poor in  urban  areas  and  thus  almost  all  transfer  funds  should  be
given  to  rural  residents. This simply  reflects  the  fact  that  the  rural  poor
P-e  much  poorer  than  the  urban  poor. Of course,  if ones  targeting  was  much
more  accurate  in  urban  areas,  an optimal  split  of funds  may lead  to
substantial  funds  going  to  urban  areas  even  if rural  areas  were  poorer,  which
at first  glance  is  somewhat  counterintuitive.
Yet  when  policy  decisions  are  made,  one  cannot  abstract  away  from
information  costs. If it  costs  2  million  CFA  Francs  to  collect  the  necessary
data in  urban  areas,  and  perhaps  10  million  in rural  areas,  the 10  million  may
be better  used  on targeting  in  urban  areas. Or, if the  costs  are  2  million
for  both  areas,  the  2  million  to  collect  data  in urban  areas  may be better
spent  in raising  the  total  amounts  transfered  to rural  areas. Thus,  marginal
analysis  is  also  essential  for  decisions  on  how to split  funds  between  urban
and rural  areas. In fact,  it is  more  useful  to pose  the  problem  in terms  of
funds  available  both  for  collection  of  new information  and  for  transfers,  so
that  there  are  4 possible  uses  of funds:  gathering  information  in  urban  areas,
gathering  information  in  rural  areas,  transfers  to  urban  areas,  and transfers
to rural  areas.
22/  These  figures  were  calculated  by increments  of 1  million  Francs,  and  thus
are  not  exact. If finer  increments  were  used  the  value  of  a  could  matter
slightly.- 31  -
V. Extensions  and  Complications
It is  hoped  that  the  discussion  in the  previous  sections  has shed  new
light  on the  problem  of reducing  poverty  in  both  developed  and  developing
countries. Yet it  must  be  admitted  that  the  exposition  proceded  rather
smoothly  in  certain  places  because  certain  issues  and  problems  were set  aside,
both  explicitly  and implicitly.  In this  section  a variety  of complications,
as  well  as extensions,  of the  procedure  taken  here  will be presented,
primarily  in  order  of simpler  issues  first  followed  by tougher  ones  later.
Recall  in  Section  II that  it  was  assumed  that  transfers  are  non-
negative. Of course,  negative  transfers  are  nothing  other  than  taxes.
Allowing  for  negative  transfers  is  conceptually  not that  difficult,  but  leads
to the  more  difficult  problem  of how  much  money  is really  available  for
transfers  to the  poor.  It is  useful  to distinguish  between  two  types  of
negative  transfers  - those  which  leave  the  person  above  the  poverty  line  and
those  that  push  him  or her  below  the  line. The first  type  have  no effect  on
the  poverty  index  and thus,  to the  extent  that  such  taxes  can  be  collected,
they  merely  raise  the  amount  of  money  available  for  transfers  (T). Once  it is
possible  that  negative  transfers  leave  some  individuals  below  the  poverty
line,  one  must  explicitly  choose  a set  of positive  and  negative  transfers
which  minimize  poverty. At this  point  one is  very  close  to the  literature  on
optimal  taxation  (cf.  Newberry  and  Stern,  1987). Yet  much  of that  literature
assumes  that  incomes  are  observable  - once  one  assumes  that  they  are  not the
analysis  becomes  correspondingly  more  complicated. Suffice  it  to say  at this
point  that  the  issues  taken  up in this  paper  ultimately  fall  into  a yet
relatively  new  area  of optimal  tax/transfer  policy  for  the  case  where  incomes
are  unobservable  (cf.  Radian,  1980).- 32  -
A second  issue  which  has  implicitly  been  ignored  is  whether  the
objective  of minimizing  poverty  in  society  conflicts  with  other  principles,
particularly  the  princ.ple  of equal  or  nondiscriminatory  treatment  of
individuals  by the  government.  Use  of dummy  variables  for  ethnic  groups  helps
in targeting  transfers,  but  amounts  in practice  to  giving  or withholding  money
to people  in  part  on the  basis  of which  group  they  belong  to.  In  many
countries  with  diverse  populations  this  practice  could  quickly  lead,  quite
literally,  to riots  in the  streets. Malaysia  is one  example  of a country
where  one  ethnic  group  (Malays)  has  been  explicitly  favored  by the  government,
but  at  a cost  of resentment  and  hostility  from  the  other  ethnic  groups  in the
population  (principally  Chinese  and  Indian). As will  be discussed  below,  one
may  want to  hide  the  "formula"  or "formulas"  by  which  transfers  are  being
made,  but this  may be  very  difficult  to do.
There  is  a technical  problem  related  to the  fact  that  higher
predictive  power  for  OLS regressions  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  a better
ability  to target  transfers  when  using  the  method  of this  paper.
Specifically,  choosing  the  parameters  for  B in  equation  (7)  (recall  that  the
functional  form  of  g(xi)  was  assumed  to  be Bzi  )  that  minimize  the  sum  of the
squared  residuals  in  a regression  ignores  the  fact  that  many poverty  indices
are  more sensitive  to  errors  in  mis-targeting  of transfers  among  poorer
individuals.  Ideally,  one  would  like  to choose  the  parameter  R  which
minimizes  the  poverty  index  for  the  sample,  instead  of  minimizing  the sum  of
the  squared  residuals. This  turns  out  to be  more involved  than  one  might
think  and  will  be discussed  in  a future  paper. Recall  that  the  papers  by
Ravallion  (1988)  and  Ravallion  and  Chao  (1988)  do minimize  poverty  directly,
but their  method  does  not  make  efficient  use  of continuous  variables.- 33  -
A fourth  shortcoming  of the  method  presented  here  is that  no
behavioral  responses  are  allowed  for  by the  individuals  who receive  the
transfers. For  example,  some  of those  who  receive  them  may choose  to  work
fewer  hours,  so that  the  increase  in income  will  be reduced  (in  extreme  cases
reversed)  relative  to  the  case  where  behavior  is fixed.231 A further
complication,  alluded  to in  Section  III,  is that  once  a program  of transfers
is  in place  people  may  change  their  behavior  in  order  to get  more transfers.
As far  as providing  false  information,  this  can  usually  be handled  when the
choice  of  variables  is  made  and  when the  cost  of collecting  the  new
information  is calculated.241  Perhaps  more  difficult  is  that  people  may
actually  change  their  behavior  solely  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  more
benefits. Quality  of housing  and  location  of residence  are  two
characteristics  which  individuals  may  change  if they  correctly  perceive  that
they  will  become  eligible  for  transfers  by living  in  lower  quality  housing  or
moving  to another  area (or  they  may  just  not  make  an improvement  to their
housing  - passive  eligibility).  To the  extent  that  "formulas"  can  be kept
"secret"  such  behavior,  as well  as providing  false  information,  can  be
reduced. Whether  the  advantages  to individuals  of  making  such  changes  are
231  Yet  this  increase  in  welfare  from  increased  leisure  should  not  be
ignored. Unfortunately,  attempts  to  measure  such  welfare  are  both
controversial  and  complex.
241  But  even  here  on3  may  want  to investigate  the  possibility  of using  biased
but inexpensive  information  instead  of completely  throwing  it  out.- 34  -
worth  the  losses  involved  is  an empirical  question.251
A final  question  to be raised  is that  of  administrative
feasibility.  Implementing  household  surveys  and  running  regressions  such  as
those  presented  here is  not  too  difficult  for  most  countries. The
difficulties  arrive  in  collecting  the  data  needed  from  the  entire  population,
as in  a census,  and  in setting  up  an administrative  network  to  deliver  the
transfers. Almost  all  countries  have carried  out  censes,  but  usually  only
every  5 to 10  years. Transfer  eligibility  should  be updated  more  often  than
that,  perhaps  on an annual  basis. Although  many  countries  have instituted
transfer  schemes  (usually  in the  form  of food  rations  or food  stamps)  the
administrative  success  of these  is clearly  mixed  (cf.  Alderman,  1988). Some
countries  may find  themselves  better  equipped  to implement  such  programs  than
others. On a more  optimistic  note,  technological  advances  in information
technology  should  reduce  many of the  implementation  costs  in the  near future.
One last  note.  This  paper  has  only  examined  targeting  with  direct
transfers  of money,  goods,  etc. Obviously  there  are  many  other  kinds  of
policies  which  will  benefit  the  poor  and  can indeed  be targeted  for  their
benefit,  such  as price  support  policies  and  the  provision  of public  services
(cf.  Besley  and  Ravallion  (1988)  for  an examination  of targeted  food
subsidies).  These  have  not  been  discussed  here  in order  to focus  on some
basic  issues. Future  work  on targeting  should  include  any  government  policies
intended  to  benefit  the  poor.
25/  See  Nicholas  and  Zeckliauser  (1982)  for  a discussion  of how  transfers  can
be set  so that  it is  not optimal  for  better  off individuals  to
"masquerade"  as poor.- 35  -
VI.  Conclusion
There  is  a broad  consensus  in  both  developed  and  developing  countries
that  poverty  should  and  can  be reduced. However,  there  is  much  less  consensus
on how  this  can  be  done.  One  problem  involves  the  difficulty  of ensuring  that
efforts  to assist  the  poor  do indeed  reach  those  who  are  poor,  which  is known
as the  targeting  issue. This  paper  has examined  the  case  where  assistance  to
the  poor  takes  the  form  of rations,  money,  vouchers,  etc.  given  directly  to
individuals  or households  which  have  been  directly  identified  as likely  to  be
poor. A formal  statement  of the  problem  was presented  in  Section  II.
The  main reason  targeting  is  troublesome  is that  one  does  not  know
the  incomes  of individuals,  and  there  is a clear  incentive  for  them  to
misrepresent  their  incomes  in  order  to obtain  more tranfers. The  third
section  of this  paper  presented  a simple  method  for  targeting  when income
(more  specifically,  households  expenditure)  is  not  observable  but  other
characteristics  which  are  correlated  with  income  can  be observed. This  method
was  applied  using  household  data  from  C6te  d'Ivoire  in  Section  IV.  Using  the
simplest  of regressions  techniques  on accurate  household  survey  data,  one  can
predict  incomes  based  on observable  household  characteristics  and  distribute
transfers  on the  basis  of these  predictions.  For  the  case  of Cate  d'Ivoire,
substantial  reductions  in  poverty  can  be made,  in some  cases  relatively  close
to  those  possible  if income  were  directly  observable.  Perhaps  of  greater
interest  to policy  makers,  substantial  reductions  can  be made  in the  amount  of
money  available  for  transfers  without  increasing  aggregate  poverty  if this
targeting  technique  is  used,  relative  to untargeted  transfer  schemes. Of
course,  the  implementation  of this  method  entails  certain  costs  for  gathering
information,  which  may  at times  outweigh  these  benefits.- 36  -
The  last  section  of the  paper  raised  several  issues  which  must  be
addressed  in the  future. The  method  of targeting  used  here  will  hopefully  be
of use  not  only in  designing  policies  to reduce  poverty  but  also in
stimulating  further  discussion  that  will lead  to  better  methods. At this
point  it seems  that  there  is  much  more  that  can  be  done,  both  at the
theoretical  and  at the  policy  implementation  level,  to reduce  poverty
effectively  and  efficiently.  Even if  the  method  presented  here is  rejected  in
favor  of  another  yet  to come,  the  paper  will  have  served  its  purpose  if  it
contributes  to any  general  discussions  which  lead  to such  a future  method.- 37 -
Table 1:  Definitions of Explanatory Variables
EASTFOR  One if household lives in East Forest region, zero otherwise.
LAREA  Log of floor area square  meters of household dwelling.
LPCAREA  Log of floor area (square  meters) per capita of dwelling.
HOUSE  One if household lives in single house, zero otherwise.
APT  One if household lives in an apartment, zero otherwise.
WALLWOOD  One if dwelling has wooden walls, zero otherwise.
WALLSTONE  One if dwelling has stone walls, zero otherwise
CEMROOF  One if dwelling has cement roof, zero otherwise.
TOILET  One if household has flush toilet, zero otherwise.
NOCOVER  One if windows of dwelling have no covering, zero otherwise.
FAUCET  One if household's drinking water is from an indoor faucet,
zero otherwise.
OPENWELL  One if household's drinking water is from a well with pump,
zero otherwise.
VOLTAIC  One if head of household is of Voltaic ethnic group, zero
otherwise.
ELEM  One if head of household has elementary level of education,
zero otherwise.
JRSEC  One if head of household has junior secondary level of
education, zero otherwise.
SRSEC  One if head of household has senior secondary level of
education, zero otherwise.
UNIV  One if head of household has university level of education,
zero otherwise.
TV  One if household owns TV, zero otherwise.
BIKE  One if household owns bike, zero otherwise.
REF  One if household owns refrigerator, zero otherwise.- 38 -
Tab:.e  2:  Urban  Regressions
Models
Variable
(1)  (a'  (3)  (4)  (5)
Constant  5.212  5.391  5.539  4.076  4.097
(25.16)  (26.96)  (27.48)  (46.81)  (47.70)
EASTFOR  -0.194  -0.218  -0.183  -0.238  -0.255
(-2.85)  (-3.36)  (-2.80)  (-4.58)  (-5.12)
LAREA  0.025  -0.016  -0.075  - _
(0.58)  (-0.38)  (-1.71)
HOUSE  0.194  0.070  0.151  0.345  1  0.114
(2.43)  (0.89)  (1.97)  (5.96)  (1.97)
APT  0.143  0.053  0.103  0.345  0.353
(1.60)  (0.61)  (1.20)  (5.96)  (6.21)
WALLWOOD  0.249  0.221  0.245  0.449  0.458
(1.58)  (1.46)  (1.63)  (3.77)  (4.04)
WALLSTONE  0.207  0.143  0.198  0.019  -0.006
(3.03)  (2.16)  (3.01)  (0.36)  (-0.12
CEMROOF  0.577  0.375  0.500  0.239  0.118
(6.53)  (4.25)  (5.90)  (3.49)  (1.75)
TOILET  0.162  0.081  0.100  0.167  0.078
(2.19)  (1.13)  (1.41)  (2.97)  (1.43)
NOCOVER  -0.675  -0.583  -0.558  -0.798  -0.717
(-1.43)  (-1.29)  (-1.23)  (-2.20)  (-2.08)
FAUCET  0.339  0.198  0.212  0.143  -0.006
(4.61)  (2.73)  (2.93)  (2.60)  (-0.124)
OPENWELL  -0.266  -0.247  -0.218  -0.257  -0.227
(-3.49)  (-3.38)  (-2.97)  (-4.40)  (-4.06)
VOLTAIC  -0.187  -0.162  -0.187  -0.142  -0.133
(-2.14)  (-1.93)  (-2.23)  (-2.12)  (-2.08)
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Table  2:  Urban  Regressions  (Continued)
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
ELEM  - 0.096  - _  0.104
(1.40)  (1.98)
JRSEC  - 0.296  - _  0.202
(3.90)  (3.43)
SRSEC  - 0.580  - - 0.272
(5.80)  (3.50)
UNIV  - 0.815  - - 0.309
(7.33)  (3.50)
CAR  _  - 0.432  - 0.307
(7.08)  (6.54)
BIKE  _  - -0.076  - -0.024
(-1.20)  (-0.50)
REP  _  - 0.168  0.048
(3.30)  (1.25)
LPCAREA  _-  - 0.627  0.582
(21.48)  (20.46)
Sample  Size  667  667  667  667  667
R2  0.331  0.393  0.396  0.608  0.654- 40  -
Table  3:  Additional  Variables  in  Regression  for  Rural  Households
WALLADOBE  One  if  dwelling  has  adobe  walls,  zero  otherwise.
WALLBAM  One  if  dwelling  has  bamboo  walls,  zero  otherwise.
FLOORBAM  One  if  dwelling  has  bamboo  floors,  zero  otherwise.
PUMPWELL  One  if  household's  drinking  water  comes  from  a  well  with  a  pump,
zero  otherwise.
OPWELLRIV  One  if  household's  drinking  water  comes  from  a  well  without  pump
or  from  a  river,  zero  otherwise.
NOWINDOW  One  if  dwelling  has  no  windows,  zero  otherwise.
DISTAB,  The  distance  by  air  (kilometers)  of  the  community  from  Abidjan,
DISTABSQ  and  its  square,  respectively.
LMKTDIST  Log  distance  (kilometers)  to  nearest  market.
LMANWAGE  Log  male  agricultural  wage  rate  (thousands  CFA Francs  per  day).
MUSLIM  One  if  Islam  is  predominant  religion  in  community,  zero
otherwise.
COCOAREA  One  if  cocoa  is  the  leading  crop  in  the  community,  zero
otherwise.
LCOCOHAR  Log  household's  land  (hectares)  with  mature  cocoa  trees.
LCAFEHAR  Log  household's  land  (hectares)  with  mature  coffee  trees.
LLANDUSE  Log  household's  land  (hectares),  excluding  cocoa  and  coffee
trees,  under  cultivation.
AKAN,  NMANDE, Dummy  variables  which  take  the  value  of  one  if  the  head  of
NONIVOR  household  is  an  Akan,  Northern  Mande  or  Non-Ivorian  (i.e.
immigrant),  respectively,  zero  otherwise.- 41  -
Table  4:  Rural  Regressions
Models
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  5.066  11.480  12.055  12.138  10.867  3.135
(8.66)  (19.26)  (20.60)  (20.98)  (20.90)  (5.77)
LAREA  -0.112  -0.162  -0.118  -0.170  - _
(-2.78)  (-4.00)  (-2.92)  (-4.08)
HOUSE  0.081  0.109  0.075  0.071  0.219  0.286
(1.52)  (2.04)  (1.40)  (1.34)  '4.71)  (6.09)
APT  0.148  0.210  0.137  0.084  0.503  0.630
(1.24)  (1,77)  (1.13)  (0.71i  (4.83)  (5.95)
WALLADOBE  -0.068  -0.105  -0.075  -0.067  -0.011  -0.026
(-1.27)  (-1.97)  (-1.39)  (-1.26)  (-0.22)  (-0.522)
WALL8AM  0.563  0.558  0.543  0.546  0.803  0.876
(1.22)  (1.24)  (1.18)  (1.21)  (1.85)  (2.07)
FLOORBAM  -0.884  -0.630  -0.894  -0.837  -1.009  -0.787
(-1.41)  (-1.03)  (-1.43)  (-1.36)  (-1.70)  (-1.36)
TOILET  0.521  0.502  0.498  0.326  0.379  0.197
(2.11)  (2.07)  (2.01)  (1.29)  (1.61)  (0.822)
PUMPWELL  -0.465  -0.423  -0.469  -0.470  -0.517  -0.478
(-4.18)  (-3.87)  (-4.22)  (-4,30)  (-4.88)  (-4.61)
OPWELLRIV  -0.329  -0.329  -0.332  -0.332  -0.361  -0.366
(-2.95)  (-3.01)  (2.99)  (-3.02)  (-3.40)  (-3.53)
NOCOVER  -0.251  -0.233  -0.272  -0.254  -0.138  -0.094
(-1.79)  (-1.70)  (-1.94)  (-1.84)  (-1.04)  (-0.723)
NOWINDOW  -0.200  -0.182  -0.200  -0.198  -0.057  -0.003
(-3.70)  (-3.43)  (-3.71)  (-3.73)  (-1.16)  (-0.05)
EASTFOR  -0.323  -0.328  -0.324  -0.326  -0.279  -0.269
(-4.13)  (-4.27)  (-4.14)  (-4.23)  (-3.76)  (-3.72)
DISTAB  -3.178  -2.698  -3.238  -3.282  -2.519  -2.100
(-3.86)  (-3.28)  (-3.93)  (-4.04)  (-3.22)  (-2.69)
DISTABSQO  3.677  3.256  3.742  3.386  3.018  2.720
(3.25)  (2.91)  (3.31)  (3.50)  (2.80)  (2.55)
LMANWAGE  0.251  0.303  0.249  0.263  0.203  0.267
(3.53)  (4.231)  (3.51)  (3.70)  (3.06)  (3.90)
LMKTDIST  -0.038  -0.030  -0.038  -0.031  -0.017  -0.002
(-1.71)  (-1.37)  (-1.71)  (-1.41)  (-0.83)  (-0.08)
MUSLIM  0.087  0.069  0.082  0.069  0.076  0.029
(1.23)  (0.98)  (1.16)  (0.98)  (1.13)  (0.43)
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Table  4:  Rural  Regressions  (Continued)
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
AKAN  -0.346  -0.319  -0.367  -0.376  -0.293  -0.286
(-5.38)  (-5.04)  (-5.65)  (-5.79)  (-4.77)  (-4.56)
NMMANDE  -0.258  -0.204  -0.284  -0.268  -0.274  -0.218
(-2.69)  (-2.14)  (-2.92)  (-2.80)  (-3.00)  (-2.35)
VOLTAIC  -0.525  -0.467  -0.539  -0.583  -0.542  -0.473
(-5.09)  (-4.51)  (-5.22)  (-5.32)  (-5.52)  (-4.48)
NONIVOR  -0.252  -0.251  -0.280  -0.333  -0.168  -0.189
(-3.06)  (-3.12)  (-3.35)  (-3.91)  (-2.15)  (-2.31)
COCOAREA  0.107  0.076  0.116  0.090  0.118  0.083
(1.72)  (1.24)  (1.86)  (1.46)  (2.00)  (1.43)
LCAFEHAR  - -0.001  _  _  - 0.016
(-0.02)  (0.42)
LLANDUSE  _  0.110  _-  - 0.133
(2.65)  (3.30)
LCOCOHAR  _  0.107  - - - 0.046
(2.51)  (1.13)
ELEM  _  - 0.140  - - -0.059
(-2.16)  (-0.97)
JRSEC  -_  0.043  - - -0.089
(0.30)  (0.64)
SRSEC  _  - 0.510  - - 0.429
(0.81)  (0.74)
CAR  _-  - 0.545  - 0.338
(4.74)  (3.11)
BIKE  _-  - 0.042  - 0.006
(1.31)  (0.20)
REF  _  - - 0.114  - 0.060
(1.09)  (0.59)
LPCAREA  _-  - - 0.318  3.135
(9.36)  (5o77)
Sample  Size  797  797  797  797  797  797
R2  0.193  0.228  0.199  0.222  0.268  0.319
Note:  Variables  with  one  asterisk  (*)  are  divided  by  1,000.
Variables  with  two  asterisks  (**)  are  divided  by  1,000,000.- 43 -
Table  5:  Targeting  Effectiveness  in  Urban  Cote  d'Ivoire
Poverty  Index
aL =  1  ta =  2  a  =  3
Initial  Poverty  Level  0.0757  0.0296  0.0142
T  =  10,000,000
Untargeted  0.0721  0.0278  0.0131
(-4.7%)  (-6.1%)  (-7.7%)
Imperfect  Targeting:  Model  1  0.0678  0.0248  0.0111
(-10.4%)  (-16.3%)  (-21.6%)
Model  2  0.0673  0.0242  0.0107
(-11.1%)  (-18.3%)  (-24.6%)
Model  3  0.0677  0.0247  0.0110
(-10.5%)  (-16.5%)  (-22.1%)
Model  4  0.0654  0.0239  0.0106
(-13.6%)  (-19.5%)  (-24.7%)
Model  5  0.0650  0.0233  0.0101
(-14.1%)  (-21.2%)  (-28.3%)
Perfect  Targeting  0.0632  0.0179  0.0055
-16.4%  (-39.7%)  (-61.2%)
T=20,000,000
Untargeted  0.0688  0.0260  0.0121
(-9.1%)  (-12.2%)  (-14.8%)
Imperfect  Targeting:  Model  1  0.0617  0.0219  0.0095
(-18.5%)  (-26.0%)  (-32.8%)
Model 2  0.0606  0.0215  0.0094
(-19.9%)  (-27.5%)  (-33.8%)
Model  3  0.0621  0.0223  0.0098
(-17.9%)  (-24.8%)  (-30.8%)
Model 4  0.0581  0.0206  0.0088
(-23.3%)  (-30.6%)  (-37.8%)
Model  5  0.0574  0.0196  0.0080
(-24.2%)  (-33.7%)  (-43.2%)
Perfect  Targeting  0.0508  0.0107  0.0024
(-32.9%)  (-63.8%)  (-83.2%)
Note:  1.  Poverty  line  =  148,690 CFAF/capita  per  year.
2.  Figures  in  parentheses  show % reduction  In  poverty,  expressed  as  a  negative
number given  various  targeting  methods.- 44 -
Table  6:  Poverty  Reductions  from  New Information: Urban  C6te d'Ivoire
Initial  New Information
Information  Perfect
Model  I  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Model  5  Infornation
T =  10,000,000
1.  None (untargeted)
a =  1  0.0043  0.0048  0.0044  0.0067  0.0071  0.0089
(-6.0%)  (-6.6%)  (-6.1%)  (-9,3%)  (-9.8%)  (-12.3%)
a =  2  0.0030  0.0036  0.0031  0.0039  0.0045  0.0099
(-10.8%)  (-12.9%)  (-11.1%)  (-14.1%)  (-16.2%)  (-35.6%)
=  3  0.002  0.0024  0.0021  0.0025  0.003  0.0076
(-15.3%)  (-18.3%)  (-16.0%)  (-19.1%)  (-22.9%)  (-58.0%)
2.  Model  I
=  1  _  0.0005  0.0001  0.0024  0.0028  0.0046
(-0.7%)  (-0.1%)  (-3.5%)  (-4.1%)  (-6.8%)
a =  2  _  0.0006  0.0001  0.0009  0.0015  0.0069
(-2.4%)  (-0.4%)  (-3.6%)  (-6.0%)  (-27.8%)
a  =  3  _  0.0004  0.0001  0.0005  0.0010  0.0056
(-3.6%)  (-0.9%)  (-4.5%)  (-9.0%)  (-50.4%)
T = 20,000,000
1,  None (untargeted)
a  =  1  0.0071  0.0082  0.0067  0.0107  0.0114  0.0180
(-10.3%)  (-11.9%)  (-9.7%)  (-15.6%)  (-16.6%)  (-26.2%)
a =  2  0.0041  0.0045  0.0037  0.0054  0.0064  0.0153
(-15.8%)  (-17.3%)  (-14.2%)  (-20.8%)  (-24.6%)  (-58.8%)
a =  3  0.0026  0.0027  0.0023  0.0033  0.0041  0.0097
(-21.5%)  (-22.3%)  (-19.0%)  (-27.3%)  (-33.9%)  (-80.2%)
2.  Model  I
a  =  1  _  0.0011  -0.0004  0.0036  0.0043  0.0109
_  (-1.8%)  (+0.6%)  (-5.8%)  (-7.0%)  (-17.7%)
a =  2  _  0.0004  -0.0004  0.0013  0.0023  0.0112
_  (-1.8%)  (+1.8%)  (-5.9%)  (-10.5%)  (-51.1%)
a  =  3  _  0.0001  -0.0003  0.0007  0.0015  0.0071
(-1.1%)  (+3.2%)  (-7.4%)  (-15.8%)  (-74.7%)
Note: 1. Poverty  reductions  are  In  terms  of  the  index  in  equation  (11).
2. Figures  in  parentheses  give  the  %  decrease  in  poverty,  for  a  fixed  set  of funds,  due  to  new
Information  (relative  to  old information),  and  are  expressed  In  terms  of  negative  numbers.- 45  -
Table  7:  Cost  Reductions  from  New Information:  Urban  C6te  d'lvoire
New Information
Initial  Perfect
Information  Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Model  5  Information
T =  10,000,000
1.  None (untargeted)
a  =  1  6,200,000  6,300,000  6,200,000  7,000,000  7,050,000  7,100,000
(-621)  (-63%)  (-62%)  (-70%)  (-70.5%)  (-71%)
a  = 2  7,400,000  7,600,000  7,100,000  8,200,000  8,300,000  8,900,000
(-74%)  (-76%)  (-71%)  (-82%)  (-83%)  (-89%)
a =  3  8,100,000  8,400,000  7,900,000  8,700,000  8,800,000  9,400,000
(-81%)  (-84%)  (-79%)  (-87%)  (-88%)  (-94%)
2. Hdef II
a  =  1  _  700,000  100,000  2,600,000  2,800,000  3,700,000
(-7%)  (-1%)  (-26%)  (-28%)  (-37%)
a =  2  _  1,700,000  400,000  2,500,000  3,000,000  6,700,000
(-17%)  (-4%)  (-25%)  (-30%)  (-67%)
a  =  3  _  2,300,000  800,000  1,800,000  2,500,000  6,900,000
(-23%)  (-8%)  (-18%)  (-25%)  (-69%)
T =  20,000,000
1.  None  (untargeted)
a  =  1  11,400,000  12,000,000  11,800,000  13,800,000  14,100,000  14,400,000
(-57%)  (-60%)  (-59%)  (-69%)  (-70.5%)  (-72%)
a =  2  13,200,000  14,400,000  13,800,000  15,400,000  15,400,000  17,600,000
(-66%)  (-72%)  (-69%)  (-77%)  (-77%)  (-88%)
a =  3  14,500,000  15,500,000  15,100,000  16,700,000  16,600,000  18,700,000
(-72.5%)  (-77.5%)  (-75.5%)  (-83.5%)  (-83%)  (-93.5%)
2.  Model  1
a =  1  _  1,800,000  -800,000  5,500,000  5,900,000  8,800,000
(-9%)  (+4%)  (-27.5%)  (-29.5%)  (-44%)
a =  2  _  1,800,000  -1,500,000  4,400,000  6,700,000  14,200,000
(-9%)  (+7.5%)  (-22%)  (-33.5%)  (-71%)
a = 3  _  1,400,000  -1,700,000  4,200,000  7,400,000  16,300,000
(-7%)  (+8.5%)  (-21%)  (-37%)  (-81.5%)
Note: 1.  All  cost  reductions  are  rounded  to the  nearest  100,000  CFA  Francs  (nearest  50,000  In  one case).
2. Figures  In  parentheses  give  the  S  decrease  in  cost  of attaining  a  given  poverty  level  due
to  new information  (relative  to  the  old information  set)  and  are  expressed  In  terms  of
negative  numbers.- 46  -
Table  8: Targeting  Effectiveness  in  Rural  C8te  d  lvoire
Poverty  Index
csl  =  a =2  c=3
Initial  Poverty  Level  0.0884  0.0375  0.0190
T =  10,000,000  0.0836  0.0347  0.0172
Untargeted  (-5.4%)  (-7.5%)  (-9.5%)
Imperfect  Targeting:  Model  1  0.0761  0.0298  0.0140
(-13.9%)  (-20.6%)  (-26.0%)
Model  2  0.0761  0.0295  0.0137
(-14.0%)  (-21.2%)  (-27.8%)
Model  3  0.0770  0.0303  0.0144
(-12.9%)  (-19.1%)  (-24.3%)
Model  4  0.0761  0.0296  0.0137
(-14.0%)  (-21.0%)  (-27.8%)
Model  5  0.0774  0.0315  0.0155
(-12.4%)  (-16.0%)  (-18.3%)
Model  6  0.0777  0.0313  0.0153
(-12.2%)  (-16.5%)  (-19.5%)
Perfect  Targeting  0.0720  0.0217  0.0071
(-18.6%)  (-42.2%)  (-62.7%)
T  = 20,000,000  0.0789  0.0320  0.0155
Untargeted:  (-10.7%)  (-14.7%)  (-18.4%)
Imperfect  Targeting:  Model  1  0.0670  0.0251  0.0114
(-24.2%)  (-32.9%)  (-39.7%)
Model  2  0.0660  0.0240  0.0104
(-25.4%)  (-35.8%)  (-45.1%)
Model  3  0.0680  0.0256  0.0117
(-23.1'.)  (-31.7%)  (-38.0%)
Model  4  0.0669  0.0245  0.0107
(-24.3%)  (-34.7%)  (-43.7%)
Model  5  0.0688  0.0269  0.0129
(-22.2%)  (-23.3%)  (-31.9%)
Model  6  0.0693  0.0268  0.0128
(-21.6%)  (-28.4%)  (-32.6%)
Perfect  Targeting  0.0556  0.0119  0.0027
(-37.2%)  (-68.2%)  (-85.9%)
Note:  1. Poverty  line  = 87,790  CFAF/capita  per  year.
2. Figures  in  parentheses  show  %  reduction  in  poverty  expressed  as  a
negative  number  given  various  targeting  methods.- 47  -
Table 9:  Poverty Reductions from New  Information:  Rural C6te d'lvoire
Initial  New Information
Information  Perfect
_________________  Model  1  Model 2  Model 4  Information
T = 10,000,000
1. Nowe (untargeted)
=  1  0.0075  0.0075  0.0075  0.0166
(-9.0%)  (-9.0%)  (-9.0%)  (-13.9%)
a =  2  0.0049  0.0052  0.0051  0.0130
(-14.1%)  (-15.0%)  (-14.7%)  (-37.5%)
a =  3  0.0032  0.0035  0.0035  0.0101
(-18.6%)  (-20.3%)  (-20.3%)  (-58.7%)
2. Model  1
a=  1  _  0  0  0.0041
(0%)  (0%)  (-5.4%)
a  =  2  _  0.0003  0.0002  0.0081
(-1%)  (-0.67%)  (-27.2%)
a  =  3  _  0.0003  0.0003  0.0063
(-2.1%)  (-2.1%)  (-49.3%)
T  = 20,000,000
1. None  (untargeted)
a =  1  000119  0.0129  0.0120  0.0233
(-15.1%)  (-16.3%)  (-15.2%)  (-29.5%)
a  =  2  0.0069  0.0080  0.0075  0.0201
(-21.6%)  (-25.0%)  (-23.4%)  (-62.8%)
a  =  3  0.0041  0.0051  0.0048  0.0128
(-26.5%)  (-32.9%)  (-31.0%)  (-82.5%)
2.  Model  1
a  =  I  _  0.0010  0.0001  0.0114
_  (-1.5%)  (-0.1%)  (-17.0%)
a  =  2  - 0.0011  0.0006  0.0132
- (-4.4%)  (-2.4%)  (-52.6%)
a  =  3  - 0.0010  0.0007  0.0087
- (-8.8%)  (-6.1%)  (-76.3%)
Note:  1.  Poverty reductions are in terms of the  index in equation (1).
2.  Figures in parentheses give the % decrease in poverty, for a fixed set of funds, due to
new information (relative  to old information), and are expressed in ter  of negative
numbers.- 48  -
Table 10  Cost Reductions  from  New Information:  Rural  C6te d'ivoire
Initial  New Informa'Ion
Information  Perfect
Model I  Modeg 2  Model 4  Information
T  =  10,000,000
1,  None  (untargeted)
a  =  1  6,500,000  6,200,000  6,300,000  7,100,000
(-65%)  (-62%)  (-63%)  (-71%)
a =  2  7,400,000  7,100,000  7,100,000  9,750,000
(-74%)  (-71%)  (-71%)  (-97%)
a  =  3  8,100,000  7,700,000  7,800,000  9,300,000
(-81%)  (-77%)  (-78%)  (-93%)
2. Model  1
a  =  1  _  0  0  2,500,000
(-25%)
a  =  2  _  300,000  300,000  6,000,000
(-3%)  (-3%)  (-60%)
a  =  3  _  400,000  700,000  7,250,000
(-4%)  (-7%)  (-72.5%)
T  =  20,000,000
1.  None  (untargeted)
a  =  1  12,600,000  12,300,000  12,400,000  14,200,000
(-63%)  (-61.5%)  (-62%)  (-71%)
a =  2  13,600,000  13,500,000  13,500,000  17,200,000
(-68%)  (-67.5%)  (-67.5%)  (-86%)
a  =  3  14,300,000  14,100,000  14,100,000  18,400,000
(-71.5%)  (-70.5%)  (-70.5%)  (-92%)
2.  Model 1
2.  aMbdel  1  . 1,100,000  100,000  6,900,000
(-5.5%)  (-0.5%)  (-34.5%)
a =  2  2,300,000  1,400,000  12,700,000
(-11.5%)  (-7%)  (-63.5%)
a  =3  _3,700,000  2,700,000  15,200,000
(-18.5%)  (-13.5%)  (-76 
Note:  1.  All  cost reductions  are rounded to the nearest 100,000  CFA Francs.
2.  Figures in parentheses  give the % decrease in cost  of attaining  a given poverty level  due
to new information  (relative  to the old information  set) and are expressed in terms  of
negative numbers.- 49 -
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